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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD L. HURLBURT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JOHN A. GULLO and ROSETTA 
FOOTE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
• Case No. 8 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Statement of issues presented on appeal: 
1. Whether the purported April 18, 1983 lease 
agreement is enforceable on its face. 
2. Whether parol evidence may be used to modify 
specific terms of the purported April 18, 1983 lease agreement. 
3. Whether Appellant had given actual or 
constructive notice of his claimed interest in the real 
property to Respondent Gullo. 
4. Whether Appellant has proveable damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents concur with Appellant's Statement of the 
Case and incorporate herein by reference such Statement. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
While Respondent does not necessarily disagree with 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, some of Appellants' purported 
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facts are mistakenly cited as facts with no basis in the record 
or are contradicted in the record and for that reason are 
disputed. Therefore, Respondents submit the following State-
ment of Material Facts, controverting only Appellant's mistaken 
version of those facts. 
1. The approximate 3 1/2-acre parcel to the south of 
the Foote home had been used for agricultural purposes by the 
Footes since ownership but for four or five years when the land 
lay dormant (Foote dep. p. 11). 
2. The irrigation ditch and fence, separating the 3 
1/2 acres from the house and garden, had been there at least 
ten or fifteen years but may not have been there when the 
Footes purchased the property (Foote dep. p. 12). 
3. Mrs. Foote did not understand the lease trans-
action. Mrs. Foote understood the agreement to be a lease for 
a specific term of years and did not understand it merely to be 
an option arrangement for subsequent years (Foote dep. pp. 15, 
16). 
4. While Respondents agree that the Footes asked Mr. 
Hurlburt to prepare a written lease agreement to set forth the 
understanding between the parties, Appellant's citations to the 
record (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) do not support Appellant's 
assertion that the lease was to provide Mr. Hurlburt a lease 
for 3 1/2 acres for an initial one-year term payable in an 
annual installment of $150 with an option to lease the real 
property for an additional five-year term upon the same terms 
and conditions. 
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5. Appellant's assertion that Mrs. Foote understood 
fully the controlling terms of the purported lease agreement is 
inaccurate (Foote dep. pp. 14, 15, 16, 30). 
6. Appellant incorrectly states at page 8 of his 
brief that Mrs. Foote informed Mr. Gullo of the Hurlburt lease 
and that four years remained under its five-year option term. 
As to the duration of the agreement, Mrs. Foote had figured 
Appellant had three more years because Appellant had farmed the 
land for two years. However, Mrs. Foote acknowledged that she 
misrepresented the duration of Appellant's term to Respondent 
Gullo because she thought Appellant had it for two years and he 
had three more years (Foote dep. p. 30). 
7. Appellant fails to identify Respondent Gullo's 
efforts to communicate with Appellant concerning the purported 
lease agreement at the time Respondent Gullo purchased the 
property from Mrs. Foote. On or about April, 1985, Respondent 
Gullo sent Appellant a letter concerning his purchase of the 
Foote property and indicated that he, Gullo, would like to meet 
with Appellant concerning his (Appellant's) purported interest 
in the land (Gullo dep. pp. 18, 19). Subsequently several 
attempts by letter, telephone, and personal visits were made by 
both Respondent Gullo and Appellant to meet, but such meeting 
never came to fruition (Gullo dep. pp. 18, 19, 20; Hurlburt 
dep. pp. 33-37). 
8. Appellant did not prepare any document which 
could have involved the recording of his purported interest in 
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the Foote property (Hurlburt dep. p. 42). Respondent Gullo was 
made aware by Respondent Foote of a tenancy interest claimed by 
a party on the property but was not initially aware of the name 
of the person claiming such interest, was not aware that any 
written document existed purporting to grant any leasehold 
interest, and was not aware that any such interest was claimed 
to be more than a year-to-year tenancy (Record p. 43, para. 
5). Subsequent to closing, Respondent Gullo, for the first 
time was made aware of a written document between Appellant and 
Foote (Gullo dep. p. 21). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Roth correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that 
to exercise an option for a five-year lease, such exercise 
would have to be done in writing to avoid the prohibitions of 
the statute of frauds. There are also other legal bases appli-
cable here which result in the same conclusion. The April 18, 
1983 purported agreement is so vague, unenforceable and too 
uncertain to have constituted a meeting of the minds, Appellant 
cannot now claim the benefit of such a document to relieve him 
of his violation of the statute of frauds by way of his oral 
exercise of a purported option. 
Parol evidence is inadmissible to supply, complete, 
and perfect a description on its face insufficient and 
incapable of application. The purported agreement states that 
Appellant "has the option to extend lease for an additional 5 
years at the same terms." Although Appellant attempts to 
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treat the document as a lease for six years, the purported 
lease is at best a purported option beyond the first year. The 
only use of parol evidence here would be somehow to attempt to 
construe the document as something other than what it appears 
to be, namely, an option. By parol evidence, Appellant seeks 
to change the terms of the agreement under the charade of 
construction rather than merely to clarify ambiguities. 
Appellant did not prepare any document which could 
have involved the recording of his purported interest in the 
Foote property, thereby preventing Respondent Gullo from 
obtaining constructive notice of Appellant's interest. 
Similarly, Respondent Foote was unaware of the specific terms 
of the lease, having been unaware that it was purported to be 
an option for additional periods of time. 
Appellant cannot prove his alleged damages with 
reasonable certainty. Appellant's claims are based solely upon 
estimates and do not fall within the required degree of 
specificity for such proof of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FINDING PLAINTIFF'S ORAL EXERCISE OF A 
PURPORTED OPTION VIOLATED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not 
applying the general legal principle that a lessee who orally 
exercises a renewal option does not violate the statute of 
frauds for the reason that the lessee holds for the extended 
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term under the original lease and not under the notice. A 
review of the case authorities cited by Appellant (App. Brief 
pp. 16-17) to support his argument reveals that in those cases 
the courts were dealing with very detailed lease provisions 
particularly with respect to the procedure as to the exercise 
of a renewal option. A review of the agreement in controversy 
in the instant matter reaffirms the inapplicability of 
Appellant's cited authority. See Continental Builders, Inc. v. 
Leach, 5 Kan. App. 766, 625 P.2d 5, 6 (1981); Grubber v. 
Castleberry, 23 Ariz. App. 322, 533 P.2d 82, 83 (1975). The 
oral exercise of a renewal option for a lease to take it out of 
the statute of frauds presupposes the existence of a writing 
which is clear and unambiguous in its terms. Such condition 
precedent to the oral exercise of an option to renew a lease 
was noted in Appellant's citation to the annotation at 51 ALR 
2d 1404, 1407 (1957): 
Verbal notice of the exercise of an option to renew a 
written lease is generally held not to come within the 
statute of frauds, for the reason that the contract 
between the parties'" is embodied in the original lease, 
the writing of which is sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the statute. And in a proper case, 
the lessor may be estopped from pleading the statute 
of frauds even though the original lease might not 
have complied with the requisite. (Citations omitted) 
(Emphasis added) 
Recognizing the existence of a such a condition 
precedent, this Court in Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, 
Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976) stated: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of 
the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
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expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness 
to be enforced . . . . (citing by footnote Valcarce v. 
Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 63, 362 P.2d 427 (1961). 
In Pingree this Court found a lease provision for an option to 
renew too vague and indefinite to be enforceable so that the 
lease terminated. This Court in Pingree cited with approval 
the following language of the Oregon Supreme Court in Slayter 
v. Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 274 P.2d 444, 446 (1953): 
The majority rule, in essence, is that a provision for 
the extension or renewal of a lease must specify the 
time the lease is to extend and the rate of rent to be 
paid with such a degree of certainty and definiteness 
that nothing is left to future determination. If it 
falls short of this requirement, it is not enforceable. 
Pingree, supra at 1321. 
The purported agreement between the parties fails to meet the 
criteria set forth in the Pingree case. 
Respondents asserted by way of argument in the lower 
court that the purported April 18, 1983 lease agreement is so 
vague and ambiguous that not only would it be unenforceable 
through specific performance, i.e., binding upon a successor-in-
interest to the property, but it also is too uncertain to have 
constituted a meeting of the minds in this case, particularly 
since neither of the Respondents was a party to the purported 
agreement. Appellant cannot claim the advantage of the rule of 
law stated in the commentary for the reason that the contract 
between the parties in the instant matter is too vague and 
ambiguous to constitute a writing sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the statute of frauds. The condition precedent 
for enforcement of the agreement is absent, e.g. a meeting of 
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the minds of the parties spelled out with sufficient clarity 
and definiteness. 
This Court has held that a written agreement or memo-
randum which is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds 
must contain all of the essential terms and provisions of the 
agreement of the parties. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co./ 
121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952); Baugh v. Logan Cityf 27 Utah 
2d 291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972). In Dale's Service Company, Inc. 
v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d 1102, 1104-1105 (1975), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
It is essential to an enforceable contract that it be 
sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and 
requirements so that it can be determined what acts 
are to be performed and when performance is complete. 
(Citations omitted) As Corbin in his treatise on 
contracts notes: 
A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can 
determine what it is. It is not enough that the 
parties think that they have made" a contract; 
they must have expressed their intentions in a 
manner that is capable of understanding. It is 
not even enough that they have actually agreed, 
if their expressions, when interpreted in the 
light of accompanying factors and circumstances, 
are not such that the court can determine what 
the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of 
expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to 
any of the essential terms of an agreement, have 
been held to prevent the creation of an 
enforceable contract. 
1 Corbin on Contracts 344, 95 (1963); Dunn v. Dunn, 391 P.2d 
885 (Okl. 1964); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 
(1962); 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts §75 at 413, §81 at 422. 
In order to have a binding contract, the minds of the 
parties must have arrived at a sufficiently definite under-
standing as to the terms so that the parties know what they are 
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bound to do and what they are to receive. Efco Distributing v. 
Perin, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 (1966). See, e.g., 
Valcarce v. Bitters, supra. This Court stated in Bunnell v. 
Bills, supra, at 600: 
A binding contract can exist only where there has been 
mutual assent by the parties manifesting their in-
tention to be bound by its terms. Furthermore, a 
contract can be enforced by the courts only if the 
obligations of the parties are set forth with 
sufficient definiteness that it can be performed. 
Additionally, a court cannot grant a decree of 
specific performance "unless all terms of the agreement are 
clear. The court cannot compel the performance of a contract 
which the parties did not mutually agree upon." Pitcher v. 
Lauritizen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (1967). This 
Court in Pitcher continued, citing 49 Am Jur Specific 
Performance, §22:: . 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and 
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to 
be supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently 
certain and definite in its terms to leave no 
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and 
no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is 
called upon to have performed, and it must be 
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court 
may enforce it as actually made by the parties. A 
greater degree of certainty is required for specific 
performance and equity then is necessary to establish 
a contract as a basis of an action at law for damages. 
Id. 
In Pitcher this Court held that an earnest money 
agreement lacked certainty in two respects: That it was not 
certain which 30 acres out of a 189 acres were to be conveyed, 
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and the agreement was unclear in its stated terms as to whether 
the balance was to be on a contract or second mortgage. 
In the present casef the purported lease, along with 
being vague and ambiguous rendering it unenforceable through 
specific performance (i.e., binding upon a successor-in-interest 
to the property), is also too uncertain to have constituted a 
meeting of the minds. Specifically, the factual basis giving 
rise to the ambiguities and contradictions involved in the 
instant matter are: 
1. The purported lease refers to an agreement "to 
lease approx. 5 acres with water." Notwithstanding that 
language, it is undisputed that the intention was not to 
involve an entire five acres, but rather the understanding 
actually involved substantially less acreage. Both the 
Appellant and Respondent Foote agree that the intention was 
that the property to be utilized involved only that portion of 
property lying south of the home property and south of a garden 
plot (Hurlburt dep. p. 22, In. 17 through p. 24. In. 3? Foote 
dep. p. 4, Ins. 13-25, p. 10, Ins. 9-16). The property as 
claimed by the Appellant, in actuality, consists of only 3 1/2 
acres in area, although the Appellant apparently assumes the 
property in question involved five acres (Hurlburt dep. p. 23). 
2. The document contains no specific metes and 
bounds description of the property which would clarify the 
understanding with certainty, particularly to the point of 
attempting to bind a bona fide purchaser without notice. This 
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is particularly critical since the entire property was not to 
be included, despite the language of the document. 
3. The agreement speaks of a lease "with water" 
without a specificity of the nature, amount, or type of water 
involved. In her deposition, Respondent Foote indicated that 
she was not aware of any water being involved (Foote dep. p. 
14, Ins. 6-10), but further added that the only water which the 
Footes had, instead of appurtenant to the property, actually 
involved shares of water (Foote. dep. p. 16, Ins. 16-20; p. 20, 
Ins. 1-3). 
4. The document contains no dates or specificity as 
to the actual commencement of the purported lease, nor the 
termination of the purported lease. 
5. The document contains no specificity as to the 
time of payment. 
6. Contrary to the understanding of Rosetta Foote 
(Foote dep. p. 15, Ins 22-25? p. 16, Ins 1-3), the document at 
best purports to provide only an option for subsequent years 
after the first year. Obviously an option requires an exercise 
thereof in order to blossom into a lease. The document does 
not include any specificity as to the time or manner of 
exercise of the option, or the effect of a failure to give such 
sort of an option. In fact, the Appellant himself has 
testified that Exhibit "A" is the only document evidencing 
these transactions (Hurlburt dep. p. 42, Ins. 8-21). It 
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follows that no document has ever been prepared purporting to 
constitute an extension of the option. 
7. The document contains no statement as to any 
remedies in the event of a default thereof. 
It is a general rule of contract construction that an 
ambiguous contract must be interpreted most strongly against 
the person who prepared the document. Bryant v. Deseret News 
Publishing Company, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (Utah 1951). Appellant 
has acknowledged that Appellant and his wife prepared the 
contract and drafted the language thereof (Hurlburt dep. p. 21, 
Ins 9-11; p. 22, Ins 11-14). Accordingly, the document being 
too vague and indefinite does not create an agreement binding 
upon the parties thereto, let alone upon persons who are not 
signators thereto; and the interpretation of ambiguities 
therein must be strongly against Appellant. Clearly, neither 
of the Respondents are parties to the agreement nor, indeed, 
understood the nature of the agreement or the terms thereof 
(Foote dep. pp. 15, 30; Gullo dep. p. 13). 
Finally, under the statute of frauds, any interest in 
land for more than a one-year period must be evidenced in 
writing to be enforceable. §25-5-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended). Assuming, arguendo, that the document dated April 
18, 1983 was an enforceable agreement, it is at best only an 
option for a term after the first year. Since the Appellant 
never exercised an option, the agreement, by its own terms, 
would lapse after the first year and, therefore, any subsequent 
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activity by the Appellant on the property was solely on a 
year-to-year basis, not under a writing which could be no 
longer effectual. 
Point II 
PAROL EVIDENCE WILL NOT BE USED TO MODIFY 
SPECIFIC TERMS OF A WRITING 
Appellant seeks to circumvent the effect of the 
purported lease, which he authored, by urging this Court that 
parol evidence is admissible to alter the terms contained there-
in. The question here is whether parol evidence is admissible 
to make certain a number of, by Appellant's admission, ambi-
guities and uncertainties in the purported April 13, 1983 
lease. 
Case authority cited by Appellant in support of his 
parol evidence argument are supportive of the Respondents1 
position, not that of the Appellant's, because these cases are 
indicative that parol evidence is not proper in the instant 
case. In answering the question raised above, this Court is 
urged to follow the well-recognized rule enunciated in Davison 
v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1973), relied 
on in part by Appellant in his brief, that "parol evidence is 
admissible to apply, not to supply, a description of lands in a 
contract." In Davison, this Court reversed a case in which the 
lower court had allowed parol evidence classified by one of 
those parties as modification of "the contract under the guise 
of construction". In that case the Court emphasized the signi-
ficant rules and holdings which are applicable in this case: 
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Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to 
supply, a description of lands in a contract. Parol 
evidence will not be admitted to complete a defective 
description, or to show the intention with which it 
was made. Parol evidence may be used for the purpose 
of identifying the description contained in the 
writing with its location upon the ground, but not for 
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land 
about which the parties negotiated, and supplying a 
description thereof which they have omitted from the 
writing. There is a clear distinction between the 
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence for the 
purpoe of identifying the land described and applying 
the description to the property and that of supplying 
and adding to a description insufficient and void on 
its face. 
Id. at 1029. 
In that case, the court then went on to quote with approval 
language of an Idaho case as follows: 
In the case at bar, there is no reference to any 
record or external or intrinsic description from which 
a complete description could be had, and no natural 
object or permanent monument is referred to in the 
writing, nor is any well and generally known point, 
place, or locality described or used as a tie. The 
evidence to be introduced would not be that of identi-
fication of a description, good on its face; but it 
would be for the purpose of supplying, completing and 
perfecting a description on its face insufficient and 
incapable of application. 
Id. 
Also, in Bernard v. Bernard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985) 
this Court citing with approval the Pitcher, supra and Davison 
cases noted: 
Specific enforcement may be granted only if the 
parties1 intent as to the essential terms of the 
agreement is clear. If the property to be conveyed 
under a land sales contract is not described by the 
agreement with certainty, specific performance of the 
agreement may not be required. 
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If the only issue involved was merely the construction 
of ambiguities, Appellant's argument involving parol evidence 
arguably could have some merit even though the ambiguities by 
themselves create substantial problems for the Appellant. How-
ever, Appellant is carrying his argument beyond legitimate use 
of the parol evidence rule by urging this Court that parol 
evidence can be used to create specific terms of an agreement, 
contrary to its express language, to match what supposedly were 
the different intentions of the parties. 
In the instant case, the disputed document at issue, 
in its sole description of the applicable property refers 
merely to "approx. 5 acres with water located at 1805 W. 400 
N., Slaterville." It is undisputed, and indeed acknowledged, 
that the property which the Appellant anticipated to lease 
includes only approximately 3 1/2 acres of an entire five-acre 
parcel. There is no attempt or language at all in the subject 
lease to locate the land based upon any "reference to any 
record or external or intrinsic description from which a com-
plete description could be had, and no natural object or 
permanent monument . . . , nor any well and generally known 
point, place, or locality described or used as a tie." 
Davison, supra, at 1029. The only purpose of parol evidence in 
the instant case "would be for the purpose of supplying, 
completing and perfecting a description on its face 
insufficient and incapable of application." Id. 
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Another clear example of the Appellant's attempt by 
parol evidence to create a new agreement also exists. The 
document in question states that the Appellant "has the option 
to extend lease for an additional 5 years at the same terms," 
Hence, although the Appellant consistently attempts to treat 
the document as a lease for six years, the purported lease is 
at most a purported option beyond the first year. There is no 
dispute that no formal written exercise of option has ever been 
made, it being clear that the Appellant and, indeed, Respondent 
Rosetta Poote who did not sign the document, assumed that the 
document constituted some sort of a regular lease. Accordingly, 
the only conceivable use of parol evidence in this case would 
be somehow to attempt to construe the document as something 
other than what it appears to be, namely, an option. Again, 
contrary to the Appellant's protestations, this Court is being 
urged to allow the Appellant to offer parol evidence to change 
the terms of an agreement "under the guise of construction", 
rather than merely to clarify ambiguities. In Commercial 
Building Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977), also 
relied upon by Appellant, this Court stated the applicable rule 
which applies to this attempt to change terms: 
The rule in the State of Utah, as elsewhere, is that 
parol evidence may be admitted to show the intent of 
the parties if the language of a written contract is 
vague and uncertain. On the other hand, such evidence 
cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain 
language of the contract. (Citations omitted) 
The Appellant, having prepared the disputed document, 
had the opportunity of putting in different terms, if, indeed, 
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other terms were intended. The Appellant now cannot come to 
this Court and ask for the admission of parol evidence in order 
to construct an agreement which the Appellant desires but which 
the Appellant did not include in the very writing governing the 
issues. 
Point III 
NO ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE WAS GIVEN 
BY APPELLANT TO RESPONDENT GULLO PRIOR TO 
RESPONDENT GULLO1S PURCHASE 
Section 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
states: 
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting 
real estate, executed, acknowledged, or proved, and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title, and 
every patent to lands within the state duly executed 
and verified according to law, and every judgment, 
order, or decree of any court of record in this state, 
or a copy of it, required by law, to be recorded in 
the office of the County Recorder, and every financing 
statement which complies with §70A-9-402 shall, from 
the time of filing the same with the recorder for 
record, impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and lien holders 
are deemed to purchase and take with notice. 
A person claiming some interest in real property must record 
the notice or document with the county recorder's office in 
order to give constructive notice to third parties. McCarthy 
v. Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1980). Appellant, by his 
own admission, did not prepare any document which could have 
involved the recording of any such interest (Hurlburt dep. p. 
42, Ins. 18-21) and the Respondent Gullo, while aware of some 
assumed year-to-year tenancy, was not aware of the existence of 
any such purported lease until subsequent to closing of his 
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sale with Mrs. Foote (Rec. p. 43, para. 5). Likewise, 
Respondent was not aware of the specific terms of the lease 
agreement, having been unaware that it was purported to be an 
option for additional periods of time (Gullo dep. pp. 13, 
21-22). Therefore, neither of the Respondents can be deemed to 
have had constructive notice of the terms of the purported 
lease agreement. 
Point IV 
APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE PROVEABLE DAMAGES 
Where an agreement between parties is so vague and 
ambiguous so as to preclude its enforcement, an action for 
damages is not supported. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Dunn 
v. Dunn, supra at 887 stated: 
Where parties in making an agreement fail to use 
language sufficiently definite to enable the court to 
ascertain to a reasonable certainty their intent, such 
agreement does not constitute an enforceable contract 
in law; nor will it support an action for damages, 
based upon a breach thereof. (Quoting Central 
Mortgage Co. v. Michigan State Life Insurance Company, 
43 Okl. 33, 143 P. 175 (1914)). 
In the instant matter, Respondents allege that the 
purported April 1983 lease agreement fails due to its vague and 
ambiguous content and hence no action for damages can survive. 
Assuming arguendo that the purported agreement between the 
parties is a valid agreement, Appellant cannot prove with speci-
ficity or sufficient certainty, his damages suffered as a 
result of Respondents1 alleged breach. 
This Court in Bunnell v. Bills, supra at 601, held: 
-18-
Where a rule of law has been established for the 
measurement of damages, it must be followed by the 
finder of fact, and to recover damages, plaintiff must 
prove not only that she has suffered a loss, but must 
also prove the extent and amount thereof. 
Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based on the value 
of the property there must be proof of its value or 
evidence of such facts as will warrant a finding of 
value with reasonable certainty. (Citations omitted) 
Appellant, however, has not carried and clearly cannot carry 
his burden of proof. In his deposition, Appellant acknowledges 
that virtually all of the alleged claims are solely based upon 
estimates and do not fall within the degree of specificity 
required for such proof of damages. Attached to this brief by 
way of addendum, is a copy of the summary of the purported 
damages prepared and submitted by Appellant (Hurlburt dep. p. 
42, Ins. 4-25). The Appellant, in his deposition, testified 
specifically about the alleged damages, as follows: 
1. The purported list contitutes a complete summary 
of the Appellant's allegations of damages owing (Hurlburt dep. 
p. 43, Ins. 4-25; p. 5, Ins 1-5). 
2. The alleged $300 rental is actually a request for 
the refund of the rental paid for the two years during which 
the Appellant had actually occupied the property and received 
full benefit for use of the property. The Appellant further 
acknowledged that the failure to receive adequate crops from 
the property was not the fault of either of the Respondents 
(Hurlburt dep. p. 20). Since the Appellant received his 
bargained-for use of the property for payment of the rental, it 
is inconceivable how he can now claim he has been "damaged" by 
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that amount and entitled to refund for rentals applicable to 
the years during which he actually used the property. 
3. All other alleged damages are solely based upon 
recollection, without adequate records, with the only possible 
exception being $342.03 which he had spent for seed during the 
two years he used the property, and accordingly received the 
benefit thereof (Hurlburt dep. p. 49, In. 13 through p. 57, In. 
9). For purposes of convenience and reference, attached hereto 
are pages 49 through 57 of the Hurlburt deposition relating to 
a claim for damages. 
There being no ability to specify any "damages", the 
Respondents are entitled to an affirmance of the summary 
judgment rendered below. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court was 
correct in granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
Respondents respectfully urge this Court, therefore, to affirm 
the judgment of the lower court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //"^ day of November, 
1986. 
Attorneys for Responsents 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondents1 Brief to be mailed, 
•vit postage prepaid thereon, to the following th is / / 
o f
 hweH4&&K^ , 1986: 
Philip C. Patterson, Esq. 
PATTERSON & PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
day 
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I Examination by Mr. Sabin 
1 I r a t e of $15 an hour. In t u r n for t h a t , he came and worked 
2 for me and f in i shed prepar ing t h a t f i e l d for p l a n t i n g . 
3 Q. And a t t h e time you worked t h e th ree"hours or 
4 s h o r t l y thereaf ter ,* you did put some n o t a t i o n in t h e book of 
5 i t h a t t h r e e hours? 
6 A. I don ' t know t h a t I have a n o t a t i o n in t h e book 
7 on t h a t or not , but I could go back and check i t . 
8 Q. What I'm t r y i n g t o f ind out i s , where did you 
9 get the information of t he $45• Is t h a t from your 
10 recollection? 
11 A. For the purpose of making this up, yes, it is 
12 from my recollection. 
13 Q. Is the entire list basically from your 
14 recollection? 
15 A. Most of it. Some of the things in regards to 
16 seed and some of these other kinds of things, we have checks, 
17 you know, receipts for. 
18 Q. Okay. Well, maybe to make it easier, would you 
19 go through the list and tell me which items you have a 
20 receipt for, that you feel that you can relate to costs for a 
21 particular item that you used on those properties? 
22 A* Well, definitely the rent on the property. The 
23 seed, the barbwire is — there involves a third party who did 
24 some work there on the property, and he purchased that 
25 barbwire I don't know if he'd have a receipt for that. 
Examination by Mr. Sabin 
1 Q- So the barbwire i s an estimate then based on 
2 your best guess? 
3 A. Well, I ca l led a place here in town, Farmers 
4 Co-op up here and asked them about i t , and t h a t ' s the price I 
5 was quoted for barbwire. 
6 Q. Yes ~ 
7 A. I didn't actual ly buy t h a t . Somebody e l se did. 
8 Q. But I'm saying the things you have particular 
9 receipts for , could you specify which ones you did? 
10 A. Well, the rent and the seed are the two things 
11 that I know for sure I could have rece ipts for* 
12 Q. Now, the rest of them you don't have s p e c i f i c 
13 rece ipts for them, but they 're your best estimate or 
14 r e c o l l e c t i o n ; i s that a fa ir statement? 
15 A* Well, some of these th ings , I'm sure i f I went 
16 back and ac tua l ly , you know, thoroughly examined some of the 
17 other records at home that I keep for tax purposes, possibly 
18 I could give you more s p e c i f i c information or more de ta i l ed . 
19 I don't know. 
20 Q. But you didn't do that for purposes of t h i s ? I 
21 mean you haven't gone back into the records and got 
22 s p e c i f i c i t y for purposes of t h i s l i s t ? 
23 A. On some i tems. Some of these things are just 
24 references . Some of these things I jus t remember. 
25 Q. I understand t h a t . I'm just trying t o es tab l i sh 
Examination by Mr. Sabin 
1 which y o u ' r e going from r e c o l l e c t i o n and which y o u ' r e going 
2 t o ac tua l records t h a t you looked a t . Now, other than t h e 
3 seed and other than t h e ren t # a re t h e r e any other a c t u a l 
4 records you looked a t t o get t he f igures t h a t you wrote on 
5 | t h a t Exhibit 2? 
6 A. I t h ink t h e r e s t of i t i s based on r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
7 Q. Okay. Now, looking a t t h a t l i s t on the front 
8 page, if you cover t he items e n t i t l e d Rent, Trac tor f u e l , 
9 Grain d r i l l s , Land p lane , Spr ingtooth and Harrow, Cut and 
10 b a i l , Seed, Barbwire and Man hours of $2140, a re those a l l 
11 a t t r i b u t a b l e t o work and expenses for 1983 and 1984? 
12 A. Yes, they a r e . 
13 Q. And so these are items which you either spent 
14 time at or spent money at that you say you should be 
15 reimbursed for, though, for those two years? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Now on that $2140 it shows 214 hours at $10 an 
18 hour. Do you have any records at all that reflect you 
19 keeping track of those hours at the time you spent the time, 
20 or is that an estimate? 
21 A. Those hours would be an estimate. 
22 Q. Okay. Now, the $10 an hour, why did you arrive 
23 at that figure? 
24 A. Well, I feel like that would have been a fair 
25 assessment. I don't think that you can hire anybody to come 
— — ^
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Exairtination by Mr. Sabin 
1 in and do those kinds of jobs , or certa inly couldn't have 
2 hired somebody to do that work for me, at l e s s than $10 an 
3 hour. 
4 Q. Okay, so that was your best guess on a fa ir type 
5 I of hourly rate? 
6 A. Yes . 
7 Q. So below that it says "additional imp." I 
8 suppose that means additional improvements. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Built two gates, repair fences, disc and plow 
11 seeded. Was that also during 1983 1984? 
12 A. Yes, it was. 
13 Q. Now the $470 obviously is 47 hours at $10 
14 there. Do you have any records presently in your possession 
15 that you kept track of of the number of hours at the time you 
16 performed them? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. So those are a l so an estimate? 
19 A. Yes, t h a t ' s correct . 
20 Q. Okay. Now, down below we show a projected t o t a l 
21 y i e l d 180 t o n s . Would you explain t o me how you arrived at 
22 that figure? 
23 A. Ground in that general area, in the Slaterville 
24 area, which is used for hay, an average production per ton 
25 would probably be somewhere in the neighborhood of three ton 
Examination by Mr. Sabin 
1 per acre as an average , and f i v e a c r e s . So f i v e t imes t h r e e 
2 i s f i f t e e n t o n , and t h a t would be per c u t t i n g . They average 
3 — or the normal for hay i s t h r e e c u t t i n g s per y e a r . 
4 Sometimes, l i k e I mentioned e a r l i e r , i f y o u f r e lucky, you do 
5 get a fourth c u t t i n g , but t h a t ' s not f i gured i n t o t h i s . 
6 Q. So the 180 tons i s p r o j e c t e d t o t a l y i e l d for 
7 what years? 
8 A. For t h e remaining t ime on the l e a s e , which would 
9 have been '85 through the t e r m i n a t i o n of the l e a s e . 
10 Q. And when would tha t be? 
11 A. Wel l , l e t ' s s e e , 1989, i f I'm doing — looking 
12 at that r i g h t . 
13 Q. Now, t h i s i s an e s t imate based upon your 
14 assumption on how many tons you would get per c u t t i n g ? 
15 A. R i g h t . 
16 Q. Per acre? 
17 A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
18 Q. Did you c o n t a c t anybody e l s e or use any s o r t of 
19 s t u d i e s or documents t o come up wi th tha t f i g u r e ? 
20 A. My own records from the product ion that I ' v e 
21 exper ienced off my other p i e c e of property , and I a l s o 
22 d i s c u s s e d i t wi th Mr. J u l i a n Powell # who probably r a i s e s more 
23 hay and s e l l s more hay than anybody e l s e in Weber County. 
24 Q. Does he do t h a t as a bus ines s? 
25 A. Yes, he d o e s . 
DEANNA H. ATKINSON — rAPTTm. PFDnD»ri?T>* 
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Examination by Mr. Sabin 
1 Q. Do you have those records of your own in 
2 possess ion that show how much hay you've raised from your own 
3 properties in the past? 
4 A« I don't have any records on i t . 
5 Q. I must have misunderstood you. I understood you 
6 t o say you got i t from your own records plus information from 
7 Kr . P o w e l l . 
8 A. No . 
9 Q. And I'm asking, do you have any records that 
10 would re f l ec t how much hay you have raised yourself on 
11 properties that you've either rented or leased? 
12 A. No records. 
13 Q. Do you have any tax records that would re f l e c t 
14 any sa l e s of hay that you had raised? 
15 A. No, I haven't . I 've never been able t o ra ise 
16 enough to have hay t o s e l l . That's part of what I was try ing 
17 t o do here. 
18 Q. Now, you're showing $90 times the 180 tons t o 
19 come up with a f igure of $16,200. Where did you get the $90 
20 f igure? 
21 A. The hay that I've bought over the past few years 
22 has usually been at that rate. 
23 Q. Now, I understood you to say that the last hay 
24 you bought was in 1983. Was I correct on that? 
25 A. Uh-huh. 
I 55 
Examination by Mr. Sabin 
1 Q. So it's based on some hay you bought from 1983 
2 prior to that time? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. And is that the primary basis for that estimate? 
5 A. Yes, it is. 
6 Q« On the second page of the Exhibit 2, right near 
7 the bottom, you indicate that you cut and baled some oat hay, 
8 360 ba les . Is that an exact count, or i s that an estimate? 
9 A* Well, I'd say i t ' s an estimate because at the 
10 time i t was actual ly done, you know, I real ly didn't have any 
11 reason to write i t down. I was using i t s t r i c t l y for my own 
12 use, for feed for my own animals. 
13 Q. So i t ' s a guess, huh? 
14 A. I t ' s an est imate . 
15 Q. Do you have an estimate of how many tons that 
16 would const i tute? 
17 A. Well, I f igure on t h i s before, there would have 
18 been somewhere between 40 and 45 bales t o the ton. Just 
19 divide that out. 
20 Q. But again, t h a t ' s a guess? 
21 A. That's an est imate, y e g ^ 
22 Q. Do you keep any sort of tax records that would 
23 — wel l , any sort of business or tax records relat ing t o your 
24 purchase of hay, your purchase of oats , your rais ing of hay 
25 and your rais ing of any other crops? 
Examination by Kr. Sabin 
A. Nope. 
Q. Do you have any tax returns that would have 
reflected any of that sort of information that you would have 
filed, say, in the last ten years? 
A. No. 
Q. Have .you ever had any tax returns that reflected 
any profit from an agricultural business other than the 
income that you've earned from your regular profession? 
A. Not that would be purely agriculture, no. 
Q. So the income that 's reflected on your tax 
returns is something other than agricultural? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So any profit that you would be anticipating in 
the future would be based upon the future estimate, not based 
upon any past records of earnings yourself on agricultural 
matters; is that a fair statement? 
A. Maybe you better say that again. 
Q. Well, you haven't picked up any income — well, 
l e t ' s put i t this way. I assume if you earned i t , you would 
have reported i t on the taxes? 
A. T h a t ' s correct . 
Q. So the fac t you d i d n ' t repor t i t on your t a x e s , 
I assumed you d i d n ' t earn i t ? 
A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q. So any es t imate of l o s t income in t h e fu tu re 
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Examination by Kr. Sabin 
would be based upon an assumption or guess or estimate, 
whatever you want to c a l l i t , of what you think you would be 
earning, not based upon any past history? 
A. I'm not sure whether you're real ly referencing 
t h i s or something e l s e . 
Q. I'm talking general ly . I'm saying i f you sa id , 
"I'm los ing X dol lars of income for the future," i t would be 
based upon a guess — 
A. Based upon t h i s , which would be an est imate. 
Q. When you say "th i s ," you're referring t o Exhibit 
2? 
A. Right. 
Q. I said that so the reporter can pick it up* 
A. Right. 
Q* Do you have any records that reflect how much 
hay you have purchased from any third parties in the last 
five years for each year? 
A* I could probably go back and look up checks 
where I've purchased hay. 
Q* Well, do you have those sort of records? 
A* Oh, yeah. 
Q. 
purchased? 
A. 
Q. 
That would re f l ec t how many tons of hay you 
Yes, i t would* 
Okay. And that would const i tute primarily 
J a n u a r y 1 5 , 19 86 HI7LBERT v s . FOOTE 
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THE COURT: My interpretation of the contract is that 
it is a lease for one year with an option to renew for five years 
generally the lav/ would be that to exercise an option for a 
ive year lease, that would have to be done in writing or it 
.
Tould be a violation of the Statute of Frauds* 
I thin): the argument under some circumstances could be 
7 made that part performance in furtherance of exercising the five 
8 
9 
vear option would take it outside the statute, but my understanding 
is the case lav; would suggest that that would be a matter of 
10 Equity to avoid unjust enrichment, and would not apply in a case 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
ike this where you are asking enforcement and money judgment. 
Also it would appear from the facts as presented in your 
lotion, and both Motions, that unjust enrichment wouldn't lie 
|Ln this case. The plaintiff simply had the right to use the 
roperty. He paid a certain amount. He used it, and he reaped 
jbhe benefit of his crop. I don't find that unjust enrichment 
JLs an argument here that can be advanced to get around the statut^ 
I think the statute of frauds applies, I don't think the 
bption was exercised in writing, and I don't think it is 
^nforcible. 
I will grant the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Ir. Sabin, you prepare the Finds and Order. 
MR. SABIN: Yes, I will. I will submit it to Mr* 
Patterson for approval as to form. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
